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Abstract: Cyber supply chain (CSC) systems provide 
operational efficiency and business continuity due to the 
integrated nature of various network system nodes. Such 
integration has made the overall system vulnerable to 
various cyber attacks and malware propagation is one of 
the common attacks for CSC. Cyber threat intelligence 
(CTI) provides an organization the capability to identify, 
gather, analyze threats and the associated risks so that CSC 
organization can forecast the existing and future threat 
trends and manage the cybersecurity risk in a proactive 
manner.  A threat actor may attack the system and 
propagate a malware. The purpose is to manipulate, alter, 
or change delivery mechanisms. It is imperative to integrate 
CTI into the existing cybersecurity practice to detect and 
understand the threat actor’s intents and motive.  In our
previous paper, we used threat analysis gathering to 
provide us an understanding of the adversaries’ 
capabilities, actions, and intents.  This paper contributes to
improving the cybersecurity of CSC by using CTI. In 
particular, we extend our previous work which identifies 
and analysis CSC attacks and adopts CTI approach to
understand the attack trends so that appropriate control 
can determine proactively.  We use the malware a smart 
grid case study as CSC context to demonstrate our 
approach.  The result demonstrations how CTI approach is 
applied to assist in preventing cyberattacks and to 
disseminate threat information sharing.
Keywords: Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Supply 
Chain, Tactics Techniques Procedure, Cyber Security, Threat 
Moddeling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber supply chain (CSC) is a network of various 
organizational components connected together with 
other vendors, suppliers, and consumers for business 
processes, goals, and objectives [1].  CSC systems are 
more prone to cyber-attack as they are vulnerable, and 
any attack can cascade from one affected node to other 
nodes. CSC attacks have increased exponentially and 
have impacted greatly on private and government 
organizations. There are many examples of successful 
cyber attacks such as Dragonfly a Cyber Espionage 
group 2011 [2], known for targeting companies through 
their supply chain [2]. Shylock Banking Trojan 2014: 
Man in a Browser attack. Compromise legitimate 
electronic banking e-products and e-process services 
websites through a website builder used by creative and 
digital agencies [2]. Saudi Aramco cyberattack 2017, an 
electric grid was halted from operation by cyber attackers 
at the Saudi Aramco power station [3]. Ukraine power 
grid attack 2016 [4]. These attacks are sophisticated and 
organized by multiple attackers. It is necessary to 
understand these attacks before implementing any 
effective CTI and control.  
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) provides an 
organization with the capability to undertake the 
actionable decision with the aim of preventing the attack. 
The purpose of CTI is to provide evidence-based 
knowledge relating to the attacker’s motives, tactics, and 
indicators of compromise which helps organizations
anticipate future threats and plan controls.  Factors such 
as known-known attacks, Known-Unknown attacks and 
Unknown-Unknown attacks that are impacting on the 
evolving threat landscapes and affecting the CSC [5].
Known-known attacks include changing the threat 
landscape and evolution of smart systems are such as 
advanced persistent threats. Cascading threat impacts on 
supply inbound and outbound supply chains that cause 
known- unknown such as malware attacks and inability 
to determine the extent of their effects on the CSC. 
Complex integrations of CSC that has caused unknown-
unknown threats such as command and control.  
The main contribution of this paper is to 
improve cybersecurity practices on CSC by using 
cyber threat intelligence. We integrate concepts 
from the CSC with CTI so that CTI can support 
security activities for the cyber supply chain using 
a systematic process. Finally, we recommend 
controls based on the CTI information so that CSC 
organization can improve its overall cybersecurity 
practice. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
 This section provides an overview of the related 
works on CSC security, recent cyber attack and CTI 
approaches that are currently being used in the industries.  
A. Cyber Supply Chain Security 
 CSC security focuses on mechanisms put in place 
to control and manage cyber attacks to ensure business 
continuity. NIST proposed three principles of best 
practices that an organization should develop for defense 
from the premise that the system will be breached [1].
Woods and Bochman 2018, reviewed the significance of 
how software component errors built into products in the 
design or implementation phase causes flaws and CSC 
attacks [3]. Abel and Islam, 2019, proposed a method 
that contributes to modeling and analyzing CSC attacks 
and cyber threat reporting [6]. Reed et al 2017, proposed 
a framework and catalog of supply chain attack patterns 
on the CSC system [7].
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B. Cyber attack 
There are numerous examples of successful cyber 
attacks. Third Party Data Store Attack 2013: A small 
botnet was observed exfiltrating information [2].  Havex 
malware 2014, targeted energy sector companies by 
spreading malware called ‘Havex’ through several 
supply chain vectors. [2]. Watering Hole attack: The 
adversary uses a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) to target 
a website of an organization supply chain system [8]. 
Wanna Cry Ransomware attack 2017, infected several 
companies and energy sectors companies worldwide [9].  
C. Cyber Threat Intelligence  
 The goal of CTI is to provide information about the 
technical indicators, context, motivation, and actionable 
advice relating to the existing and emerging threat.  
ENISA 2018, propose strategic CTI goals that support 
executives in decision making, operational goals that 
provide an understanding of the threat actors modus 
operands, intents, and TTPs, then tactical goals into 
concrete detection capabilities [5]. MITRE 2013, pull 
together a comprehensive set of data sources system 
security engineering to provide a holistic view of supply 
chain attacks of malicious insertion and generated a 
catalog of attack patterns for risk management purposes 
[10].  Friedman & Buchanan, proposed CTI approach 
based on the organizational intelligence requirements, 
collect information, analyses and disseminate to protect 
assets and documents. The process includes developing 
[11]. Zane Pokorny 2018, proposes a CTI lifecycle 
approach that includes direction, collection, process, 
analysis, and dissemination required to identify 
intelligence goal [12].
Scott et al 2019, demonstrated the stages of network-
based vulnerabilities, attack, methods on supply chain 
systems and applied the concepts of kill chain including 
countermeasures [13]. NERC, 2017, developed an 
objective based on reliability standards that realistically 
address the reliability gaps in CSC security process [14].
CAPEC proposed attack patterns that focus on disruption 
of supply chain lifecycle through the manipulation of the 
software, hardware, and services during product 
manufacturing and distribution [15].
ENISA 2018 proposed strategic CTI goals that support 
executives in decision making [5]. Further, MITRE 2013 
proposed software security engineering concepts for 
CSC attacks [10]. Additionally, Zane Pokorny 2018 
proposed a CTI lifecycle approach required to identify 
intelligence goals [12]. Similarly, Scott et al 2019 
proposed to kill chain concepts for CSC vulnerabilities 
and attacks [13]. However, none of the authors identifies 
and analysis CSC attacks and adopts CTI approach to 
understand the attack pattern, TTPs, and trends from 
smart grid CSC organizational context.  
III. Integration of CTI for CSC 
Integrating CTI in CSC systems has become integral 
due to factors such as an increase in the use of a
sophisticated cyber physical system (CPS). The 
proposed approach considers CTI core cyber threats 
concepts such as indicators, TTPs, incident, and threat 
actors and links them with CSC concepts such as goal, 
inbound and outbound supply chains. It also includes a 
process to analyze the cyber threat. 
A. Why CTI is Important for CSC 
CTI is relevant for CSC as it provides detailed 
knowledge and understanding of the threat actor’s
motives and intent required to implement CSC security. 
Further, the globalized and distributed nature supply 
chain systems have made it significant to include CTI in
CSC.  Additionally, the complex, logical and relational 
entities involved in the CSC network systems 
developments lifecycle as well as the number of channels 
or vendors that handle this product and services before it 
gets to the final customer are also factors. Thus, without 
the required integration of CTI lifecycle approach into 
CSC development, it will be highly unlikely to 
effectively mitigate the attacks, risks, vulnerabilities, and 
exploits that are currently prevailing on CSC systems.
B. Proposed approach 
This section uses the CTI approach, process lifecycle and 
its integration for cyber security analysis of CSC to 
provide a method of determining the threat intelligence 
concepts. We use CTI concepts from existing literature 
[5, 10, 12, 13].    
C. CTI  Lifecycle Implementation 
CTI lifecycle implementation Phase and a brief 
process as below: Direction, Identify, Gather, Machine 






















































Figure 1. Cyber Threat Intelligence Lifecycle 
D. CTI Phases 
Direct: The direction phase requires that the 
organization strategic, tactical and operational 
management come together to decide on CTI goals and 
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objectives. Further, they must form a CTI strategic 
management team to oversee the identification, 
investigations, review, and evaluate the supply chain 
system processes and applications. The objectives 
include: Assign a CTI lead manager, Identify security 
goals to inform proper CSC security controls.  
Identify: The identification process includes 
identifying all the organizational goal, CSC 
requirements, assets, supply chain network nodes, IP 
address, technical threats, and human threats. 
Gather: The gathering process involves gathering 
sources of attacks, vulnerable spots, risks TTPs. The data 
are gathered from firewalls logs, collecting a signature,
threat indicators and events from IDS/IPS, antimalware 
from the various endpoints. We expound on TTP and 
threat indicators as follows:  Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures (TTP) is a representation of the behavior or 
modes of operations of the adversary [16].   
Tactics: Includes how the adversary carries out 
reconnaissance for initial intelligence 
gathering. Tactics may be to use redirect 
victims to a compromise electronic banking e-
products and e-process service website to gain 
access into the supply chain system.  
Techniques: are the tools, skill, and capabilities 
deployed. Use social engineering technique and 
send a spear phishing email or attach a redirect 
script into a website software so that whenever 
the victims download and install, it open and 
provide access to the adversary.  
Procedures: are uniquely used a set of tactics 
and techniques for an attack. Procedures may 
vary depending on the threat actor’s goal, 
motive, purpose, and intent. The advance actor 
may deploy highly sophisticated procedure 
such as APT.  
Process: Translating data into meaningful 
information and use decryption tools for hashing 
functions.  This includes analyzing IDS/IPS logs,
firewall logs, and Antimalware intrusions predict attacks 
that could be fed into the CTI. These assist in determine 
false positives and false negative rates alert on the dataset 
and accurate predictions.
Analysis: The process includes analyzing the 
Identify attack patterns, motives, and intents to 
understand TTPs. Analyze the logs, alerts, to understand 
the attack trends as identified in the initial process. This 
includes identifying what happened, how, why, when, 
who and where on the CSC system. 
Evaluate the threats, risks, and impacts on CSC.
Formulate an understanding of the effects on business 
process, organizational goal and the financial impact and 
for budgeting. Additionally, we use a cost benefit 
analysis to determine the cost of alternatives.  
Report. This phase reports on the findings of the 
analysis and evaluations for strategic management 
decision makings. It determines the Known-known 
attacks, Unknown-Unknown, and Known-Unknown 
attacks. The process provides a mechanism for control 
required to ensure strategic management decisions to 
mitigate these treats. Additionally, it is used for third 
party auditing purposes, configurations, and 
conformance. 
Disseminate: The process includes how CTI 
information is shared to various organization, 
institutions, vendors and businesses on the CSC system. 
It designates information and creates awareness on the 
various alerts, how to assess and monitor threats, risk, 
and control. Additionally, system developers could use 
the information for software developments purposes.
Review: The review phase requires management to 
hold ad-hoc, periodically and annual security meetings to 
monitor security threats, understand the threat landscape 
and ensure the systems are certified. These ensure 
information assurance and situational awareness. 
These CTI lifecycle and reports approach to inform 
the required strategic, tactical and operational security 
decision-making and controls that must be implemented 
in the relevance of the CTI. 
IV. DETECTING CTI USING ATTACK 
PATTERNS, VECTOR AND TTP 
Due to the lack of visibility of cyber threats and the 
phenomenon surrounding its impacts, it is imperative 
that we model the attack lifecycle to inform our CTI 
lifecycle. This section considers attack pattern, 
prerequisites, vectors, TTP and indicators as properties 
in realizing   CTI for CSC security goal.  
The attack pattern has a prerequisite as a property that 
provides the adversary the necessary information after 
carrying out reconnaissance to determine whether the 
system is exploitable or not. This information could 
assist us in carrying out supply chain risk assessments. 
For instance, the adversary could gain access when the 
following vulnerabilities exist in the supply chain 
system: 
The supply chain variables are accessible to the 
threat actor due to poor constraints and server 
misconfigurations on the CSC system.  
The business applications used for the supply 
chain variables could be exploited through the 
use of incorrect user data. 
Information retrieved through inputted data is
not configured properly due to poor validation.   
The variables are not well encapsulated to 
prevent software redirect. For instance, setting 
an input variable as public in a class when 
developing the software source codes makes the 
website open to external attackers 
A. CSC Attack Life Cycle 
This section follows concepts from 3.1and implements 
the CTI life cycle process to achieve organizational 
security goal.
Phase 1: The organizational goal is to adopt a CTI 
approach to identify attack patterns, TTPs and threat 
indicators. This includes the executive summary of 
organizational goal, identification of assets, strategic 
objectives, and assigning security team/lead to oversee 
the implementation of CTI lifecycle as in (Direct Phase).    
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Phase 2: The attacker goal is to abort the security 
goal by using Malware, SQL injection, XSS or session 
high jacking attacks to penetrate the system to 
manipulate or cause DoS attacks. In the identification 
phase, the security team identifies the CSC system 
vulnerabilities, risks, and attacks that could impact the 
assets and supply chain system.  This includes using 
TTPs to determine the attacker goal. The figure below 
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Figure 2. Supply Chain Attack Life Cycle
The CTI approach and parameters are used to express an 
indication of an attack. The attacker goal determines the 
attack pattern to use e.g. malware, spyware or Injection. 
Further, the attack pattern determines the prerequisites 
required after carrying out reconnaissance on the victim's 
system to determine if an attack will be successful. The 
perquisites determine the attack vectors that will be 
deployed against the victim. After all these steps have 
been achieved, then the attacker uses the TTPs which act 
as a schema for the attacker goal. Implementing the 
gathering, processing, and analysis in phase 3, 4, and 5 
as discussed in 3.1 provides us the processed information 
required for our threat intelligence gatherings.   
B. CTI Indicators for CSC 
CTI Indicators are TTP parameters that express that an 
attack of a certain nature is imminent, in progress or has 
occurred. We use SCS threat activities, adversary 
behaviors, risky events, or state of the incident to 
determine what could serve as an indicator. The CTI 
indicators provide: 
CSC attack incidents and course of actions  
Nature of cyberattack indicators   
TTPs that were deployed  
The CTI Indicators convey specific observable patterns 
of CSC attacks combined with contextual intelligence 
that represent threat actor’s behavior.  
V. CONTROLS 
Controls are a security mechanism put in place to 
mitigate specific cyber threats. The CTI lifecycle, TTP 
lifecycle, and reports inform the required directive, 
preventive, detective, recovery and corrective controls. 
The following provides CSC control.
Table 1. CSC Security Controls and Recommended Standards Reference. 







Identify and manage 
inventory of hardware 
devices on the network. 
Give only authorized 
device access.
Attacker’s interest is in 
devices as which might 
be out of synch with 


















date inventory and 
audit trail. That 
identifies assets









Identify and Manage 
inventory, identify, and 
correct all software so 
that only authorized 





Attackers scan victim’s 
websites for 
vulnerabilities to 
remotely exploited. Or 
distribute hostile web 
pages and document 
files, or trustworthy 
third-party sites. 
Control software 
plays a critical role 
in planning and 
executing system 
backup, incident 









alerts on all assets 








assess, and take action 
on new information in 
order to identify 
vulnerabilities, 
remediate, and minimize 
the window of 




Understand threat and 
vulnerabilities. The 
activity requires time, 
Attackers exploit 
vendors. When a 
new vulnerability 
is known. Develop 
patches or 
signatures updates, 
and defenders to 
Organizations 





Utilize tools to 
automatically scan 




















Not changing the hard-
coded password default. 
Impacts on the processes 
and tools used to 
track/control/prevent/co
rrect user, assignment, 
and configuration of 
admin privileges.
Misuse of admin 
privileges is a primary
method for attackers to 
get inside a target 
system. Technique




running as a 
privileged user is 














to issue a log entry 
and alert when an 
account is added to 
or removed from 














and actively manage 
(track, report on, correct)  
security configuration of 
mobile laptops, servers, 
workstations using 
configuration




with good security 
properties is a complex 
task beyond the ability 
of individual users, 
requiring analysis of 
options and CTI 
gathering
































of Audit Logs 
Collect, manage, and 
analyze audit logs of 
events that could help 
detect, understand, or 
recover from an attack.
Deficiencies in security 
logging and analysis 
allow attackers to hide 
their location, 
software, and activities 
on victim machines.
Logging records 
are evidence. Keep 











logs are aggregated 
to a central log 
system for 
analysis& review
VI. SMART GRID CASE STUDY 
We use a case study of a smart grid system that was 
compromised for our analysis in relation to the CTI 
approach in section 3. The security team failed to update 
the software and the adversaries insert malware to 
exploit that vulnerability to gain access to the control 
center. Also, the default hard-coded passwords 
credentials were not changed and that gave the attacker 
remote access to the network system. For us to the CTI 
approach to determine the attacks, we first analysis the 
TTP the attacker deployed on the supply chain system. 
We use figure 3 below to determine the attack pattern. 
Security Goal: was to implement ad-hoc,
periodic and regular software updates on the 
supply chain system. Change the default-
hardcoded password.   
Nature of Attack: Insert malware to exploit the 
vulnerability and gain access to the system 
Attacker Goal: Take Command & Control and 
exploit the default hard-coded password to 
obfuscate. 
Step 1. Reconnaissance: Adversary search 
online and uses other social engineering 
methods to gather information e.g. Network 
Topology, IPs, Software, and Configurations.
Step 2. Experiment: the adversary uses various 
attack methods (TTP) and tools to gain control 
of the victim's systems as intrusion set. 
Step 3. Exploit: compromise the system at this 
stage and gains access to the systems and 
determines the attack goal.  
Step 4: Command and Control: adversary uses 
remote access and APT technics to establish 
control on the victim CSC system and 
compromise the default hard-coded password 









TTP: Use open 




software in Victims 
software 
components
Figure 3. Attack Pattern 
A. Cyber Threat Intelligence Gathering.
Threat intelligence gathering assists in understand 
the attacker’s mode of operations that includes 
identifying: 
What is the attacker trying to achieve (Goal)
What are the capabilities in the form of tactics 
Techniques that they have leveraged overtime 
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Procedures that they are likely to leverage 
B. Determining Controls Using CTI  
We select a particular event such as a malware attack on 
the smart grid to determine the CTI lifecycle as 
discussed in section 3. 
Identify all the actors, access rights and 
privileges 
Carryout vulnerability assessment
Carryout a Risk Assessment on the supply 
chain
Combine probability on attacks with its 
potential impact on the CSC
Identify Controls and Standards required to 
secure the system.
VII. CONCLUSION 
Cyber Threat intelligence gathering is a proactive way to 
assist organizations to gather, analyze and disseminate 
intelligence, CTI could assist in determining whether an 
attack could occur in the near future. For instance, if an 
organization experience 40% of spear phishing or 
malware attacks after a threat analysis report, we could 
say that there will be the frequency of attacks in the 
future. CTI requirements could be used to determine the 
vulnerability of the system to understand of Known-
known attacks, Unknown-Unknown, and Known-
Unknown attacks. These are major CSC attacks such as 
penetration, manipulation, APT and command & control 
attacks. TTPs consist of the specific adversary behavior 
exhibited in an attack, it leverages on resources such as 
tools, infrastructures, capabilities, and personnel. It 
provides CTI information on the victim's target (who, 
what or where), that are relevant to exploit targets being 
targeted. CTI life cycle phase provided us the intended 
effects, kill chain phases, handling guidance and 
resources of the TTP information. The CTI gathered will 
inform the strategic, tactical and operational 
management roles and responsibilities. Operational level 
managers could use the CTI indicators, to determine 
details of attacks and TTPs, relate attacks and provide 
remediation from the control statement. Tactical level 
managers could use CTI to feed into the security 
requirement, validate and prioritize indicators for 
configuration, auditing, monitoring and escalating threat 
alerts to the right sources for security products 
procurements. Strategic level CTI will assist in financial 
resources allocation, provide a blueprint for executive 
summary and executive management authorization.    
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